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Something Old, Something New?
Re-Theorizing Patriarchal Relations
and Privatization from the Outskirts
of Family Law
Shelley A.M Gavigan*
Canada has an enviable record of relatively progressive and
egalitarian legislation and policy in relation to Canadian family
forms. The country ' constitutional guarantees of equality and
multiculturalism provide the legal foundation for this record. In
particular, Canada ' leadership in the recognition of and support
for same-sex relationships in family law and social policy is widely
acknowledged.
This is, however, also deeply contested terrain: Feminist legal
scholars informed by critical political economy argue that recent
family law advances in Canada sit compatibly with neo-liberal social
policy and restructuring of the welfare state; the neo-conservative
and religious right assert that the fundamental nature of family
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and I thank them for their extraordinary support in this process. I thank Dr.
Yuval Merin for his insightful commentary on the conference paper and my
fellow conference participants for their comments and for the richness of the
discussion throughout the conference. I also acknowledge with great thanks the
research assistance ofAnastasia Mandziuk (Osgoode JD 2012) and Joy Mathews
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of Karen E. Andrews on earlier drafts of this Article, and the sharp eyes and
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has been undermined by the recognition of same-sex marriage,
facilitating the legal recognition ofpolygamous relationships, among
others. Still others take the view that despite a liberal, progressive
andformally egalitarian approach to family, the legal recognition of
same-sex marriage in Canada reflects and reinforces a historically
patriarchal, heterosexual institution that should be jettisoned rather
than embraced. These arguments raise issues and illustrate more
generally the tensions in state and legal construction and regulation
offamilial relations - historically and in the current context. In
this Article, I re-theorize the significance ofpatriarchy and the
relationship between patriarchal relations and the discourse of
privatization in critical family law. Using the experience of women
from the "outskirts" - lesbian spouses, welfare mothers, and women
in polygamous relationships - I demonstrate the limits ofany theory
of "privatization" that does not theorize patriarchal relations. In
particular, I identify and analyze the impediments to equality posed
by increasingly invisible, but no less enduring, patriarchal familial
ideologies in order to envision forms offamily law reform and state
social policy that might actually improve gendered and generational
familial relations and transform the social landscape more generally.
INTRODUCTION
"Are the suburbs there to keep us in or to keep them out?"'
Is family law there to keep them in or to keep us out?
It was once tantamount to a feminist axiom to refer to the pride of place
occupied in state and social policy by the patriarchal nuclear family, and to the
celebration of its importance to social stability, the values of its domesticity,
and the roles of male breadwinners and dependent housewives.2 However,
1 Bernadette Basinger (Terrance Stamp) poses this rhetorical question to her two
friends, fellow drag performers, on their road trip from Sydney to Alice Springs
in Australia's Northern Territories, in Stephen Elliott's film, THE ADVENTURES
OF PRISCILLA, QUEEN OF THE DESERT (Gramercy Pictures, 1994).
2 See, e.g., Shelley A.M. Gavigan & Dorothy E. Chunn, From Mother's Allowance
to Mothers Need Not Apply: Canadian Welfare Law as Liberal and Neo-Liberal
Reform, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 733 (2007) [hereinafter Gavigan & Chunn, From
Mother 's Allowance]; Shelley A.M. Gavigan & Dorothy E. Chunn, Women, the
State, and Welfare Law: The Canadian Experience, in THE LEGAL TENDER OF
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as many scholars also have noted, the precise form of the legal supports
for the patriarchal family has been more uneven than constant. There have
been important shifts away from "pure" unmediated patriarchy.' Indeed,
it has been argued that in the transition to and consolidation of capitalist
social relations, the legal underpinnings of patriarchy were eroded.' A less
sweeping claim can surely be made: that family law reform together with
other areas of law reform (such as decriminalization of abortion and the
repeal of the marital rape exemption, two examples from criminal law) have
also been sites of struggle, and of inhibition and mediation of patriarchal
relations. Recently in the Canadian context, even marriage - historically one
of the most important sites for the reproduction of relations of domination,
subordination and subservience - has been reinvented on new ideological
terms and has emerged as the pristine site of formal equality.
The relationship between law - as opposed to state and social policy
- and patriarchy is arguably an uneven one, and this unevenness has led
both critics and defenders of patriarchy to suggest its demise. However, to
borrow from Mark Twain, reports of the death of patriarchy have been greatly
exaggerated.
This Article explores ongoing tensions and contradictions in the area of
family law through feminist socio-legal theorizing at the outskirts of "law's
families." It argues that despite their apparently disparate locations and uneven
relationships to conventional family law, the poor single mother on welfare,
the lesbian spouse, and the second and subsequent wives of polygamy can
illuminate and deepen an understanding of the central premises of family law,
and thereby assist in the ongoing project of its theorization and re-theorization.
GENDER: LAW, WELFARE AND THE REGULATION OF WOMEN'S POVERTY 47 (Shelley
A.M. Gavigan & Dorothy E. Chunn eds., 2010); see also ELIZABETH WILSON,
WOMEN AND THE WELFARE STATE (1983); WOMEN, THE STATE AND WELFARE (Linda
Gordon ed., 1990); Patricia Allatt, Stereotyping: Familism in the Law, in LAW,
STATEAND SOCIETY 177 (Bob Fryeret al. eds., 1981); Mary Mcintosh, The State
and the Oppression of Women, in FEMINISM AND MATERIALISM: WOMEN AND MODES
OF PRODUCTION 254 (Ann Marie Wolpe & Annette Kuhn eds., 1978).
3 See, e.g., Dawn H. Currie & Marlee Kline, Challenging Privilege: Women,
Knowledge and Feminist Struggles, 2 J. Hum. JUST. 1 (1991); Shelley A.M.
Gavigan, Petit Treason in Eighteenth-Century England: Women s Inequality
Before the Law, 3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 335 (1989-1990); Juliet Mitchell, Women
and Equality, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF WOMEN 379 (Juliet Mitchell & Ann
Oakley eds., 1976); Carol Smart & Julian Brophy, Locating Law: A Discussion
of the Place of Law in Feminist Politics, in WOMEN IN LAw: EXPLORATIONS IN
LAw, FAMILY AND SEXUALITY 1 (Julian Brophy & Carol Smart eds., 1985).
4 WILSON, supra note 2, at 42.
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The claims for right of access by some, and resistance to relegation by
others, to law's family tent have occupied important, yet contested, social,
political and theoretical spaces for the last two decades. A new discourse
invoking equal spouses and equal families, accompanied by critiques of
heterosexual privilege, hetero-normativity, privatization, assimilation, and
conjugality, has dotted the critical feminist and queer legal intellectual
landscape. The implications of shifting and expanding definitions of
familial and spousal relations have been subjected to critical analyses by
feminist scholars employing, inter alia, discourses of "privatization" and
"familialization."
Still more recently, the debates about the implications of the criminalization
of polygamy, and its provenance in an era of prescribed, and legislatively
enforced, conventional Christian monogamy,' have found a place at the
table in the family law tent. Constitutional law scholars, as well as court-
appointed amicus curiae who characterize polygamy's alleged mischief
as "inscrutable,"' worry about the implications of its status as a crime for
vulnerable and marginalized women and children of polygamy, and argue
that its continued criminalization in Canada,' including the sweep of the
5 Historian Sarah Carter has demonstrated that this was an important, if
challenging, undertaking for the young Canadian state as it sought to settle and
transform the western prairies into an image and practice consonant with white,
English-speaking values. Although the First Nations were an important target
of legislatively enforced monogamy, other "non-conformist marriages" were
also regarded as problems, especially American Mormons, but also Russian
Doukhobor and Ukrainian immigrants and aspirant Chinese immigrants. See
SARAH CARTER, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING MONOGAMOUS: MARRIAGE AND NATION-
BUILDING IN WESTERN CANADA TO 1915, at 20 (2008).
6 Susan G. Drummond, Polygamy Inscrutable Criminal Mischief, 47 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 317 (2009).
7 Martha Bailey, Beverley Baines, Bita Amani & Amy Kaufman, Expanding
Recognition of Foreign Polygamous Marriages: Policy Implications for
Canada, in POLYGAMY IN CANADA: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN: A COLLECTION OF POLICY RESEARCH REPORTS 19 (Angela Campbell
et al. eds., 2005); Beverley Baines, Polygamy & Challenge: Women, Religion and
the Post-Liberal State, 2 LES ATELIERS DE L'ETHIQUE 23 (2007) (Can.), available
at http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/lMG/pdfVol.2NI.pdf.
8 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 293 (Can.) provides in part that a
polygamist is:
(2) Everyone who
(a) Practices or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practice
polygamy or enter into
(i) Any form of polygamy, or
274 [Vol. 13:271
Something Old, Something New?
offense, potentially captures many relationships and violates the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms,9 including the right to freedom of religion."o
The central argument of this Article is that despite their different
foci, feminist rethinkings of polygamy, privatization, conjugality, and
familialization share unacknowledged, unbroken common ground represented
by a neglect to subject to serious scrutiny the normatively and ideologically
patriarchal foundation of apparently "privatized" family forms, whether they
be polygamous, same-sex, or poor mother-led. Even in the Canadian context
where same-sex marriage has been accepted, where couples need not marry in
order to access health and extended care benefits, and where some provinces
have extended their family property regimes to include unmarried cohabiting
partners, the extent to which discourses, common sense understandings, and
social practices relating to families are informed by patriarchal ideology
continues to be neglected by legislatures, policymakers, and feminist critics
alike. Without an appreciation of the power and enduring appeal of patriarchal
ideologies, of their complexities and contradictions, and of the barriers and
constraints they impose, the development of alternative perspectives regarding
gender and familial relations, and of real gender equality within and without
the family, will remain an illusory ideal in Canadian society. This, as I have
argued before," requires a particular form of theoretical engagement which
(ii) Any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same
time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage.
9 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K.)).
10 See Drummond, supra note 6; Wendy Stueck, Polygamy on Trial, GLOBE
& MAIL, Nov. 22, 2010, at A7. Drummond offers a novel interpretation of
the scope of this prohibition in support of her argument that its breadth and
vagueness violate section 7 of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms.
Focusing on the requirement of "conjugal union" in the section, and offering a
novel interpretation thereof, Drummond has come out as a polygamist and has
invited criminal prosecution: having been separated but not yet divorced from
her husband, she entered into a new relationship and began to live with another
man. Drummond believes she found herself on the wrong side of the criminal
law. Invoking the language of section 293, she argues that she had entered into
a "conjugal union with more than one person at the same time." Leaving aside
my own view that she had left one conjugal union and entered into another, there
are, as I discuss below, different approaches to the significance of conjugality
to cohabitation as between Canadian welfare law and family law.
11 See, e.g., Shelley A.M. Gavigan, Legal Forms, Family Forms and Gender Norms:
What Is a Spouse?, 14 CAN. J.L. & Soc'Y 129 (1999); Shelley A.M. Gavigan,
Paradise Lost, Paradox Revisited: The Implications of Feminist, Lesbian and
Gay Engagement to Law, 31 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 589 (1993) [hereinafter Gavigan,
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analyzes the form(s) of law and the content of social relations, often rendered
less visible.
The argument is advanced in two major Parts: Part I demonstrates the
changing contours of the Canadian legal framework and Canadian family
law's response to "new" families, notably same-sex families and introduces
the two theoretical axes of the Article: law's relationship to patriarchal
relations and law's relation to privatization. In Part I of the Article, I use three
exemplars drawn from the outskirts of family law - lesbian spouses, welfare
mothers, and polygamous wives - to demonstrate the limits of the discourse
of privatization, the enduring relevance of patriarchal familial ideology, and
ultimately the uneven and contradictory contribution of law.
1. FAMILIES AND LAw: THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF THE
CANADIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Canada does have an enviable record of relatively progressive legislation
and policy in relation to Canadian family forms. Constitutional authority is
divided between the federal and provincial levels of government. For instance,
marriage and divorce fall within federal jurisdiction. Early in the twenty-first
century, the requirement that marriage be restricted to persons of the opposite
sex was on shaky legal grounds in Canada. Building on a 1999 decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada that struck down the opposite sex requirement in
Ontario's legislative definition of "spouse" for the purpose of spousal support
as violating the Charter 's equality guarantees,12 lesbian and gay activists
went to court to make the case for the legitimacy and legality of same-sex
marriage. And, they enjoyed success.
By the end of a frenzied litany of victories in 2003-2004 in provincial
courts across the country upholding the challenges to the federal Marriage
Act,13 beleaguered government lawyers had ceased to oppose the applications
Paradise Lost]; see also Dorothy E. Chunn. & Shelley A.M. Gavigan, Welfare
Law, Welfare Fraud, and the Moral Regulation ofthe 'Never Deserving'Poor,
13 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 219 (2004).
12 M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
13 See, e.g., Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 172 O.A.C. 276, (Can. Ont. C.A.);
EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2003] 13 B.C.L.R 4th 1 (Can.
B.C. C.A.) (additional reasons for the B.C. C.A decision are reported in (2003),
42 R.F.L. 5th 341 (Can. B.C. C.A.)); Hendricks v. Qu6bec (Att'y Gen.), [2004]
238 D.L.R. 4th 577 (Can. Que. C.A.); Vogel v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2004] M.J.
No. 418, 2004 CarswellMan 527 (Can. Man. Q.B.); W.(N.) v. Canada (Att'y
Gen.), [2004] 11 R.F.L. 6th 162 (Can. Sask. Q.B.).
276 [Vol. 13:271
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of same-sex litigants. The federal government drafted and referred a new Civil
Marriage bill to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2003 for determination of
its constitutionality. In 2004, over the strenuous opposition of interveners
representing many conservative religious and advocacy groups, the Supreme
Court affirmed the constitutionality of proposed federal legislation that for the
first time in Canadian history defined civil marriage "as the lawful union of
two persons to the exclusion of all others." 4 Same-sex marriage had been won.
Beyond marriage and divorce, numerous federal statutes dealing with matters
under federal jurisdiction (such as old age security, pensions, employment
insurance, income tax, immigration, Criminal Code, and the Indian Act, to
cite only a fraction) also contemplate, define and, inevitably, regulate spousal
and familial relations. In response to the 1999 Supreme Court decision, the
Canadian government had introduced The Modernization of Benefits and
Obligations Act," which amended the definitions of spouse in sixty-seven
federal statutes to bring them into line with the Supreme Court's decision.
The Law Commission of Canada, since dismantled by the federal
government, continued to contribute to and develop the public discourse
through the release of its report, Beyond Conjugality, which reconsidered the
legislative requirement of conjugality and proposed an alternative methodology
for analyzing whether relationships are relevant to the distribution of benefits
under legislation. The Commission called on the federal government to
develop a still "more comprehensive and principled approach to the legal
recognition and support of the full range of close personal relationships among
adults."'6 Beyond Conjugality proposed a new methodology, which would
move beyond conventional or unexamined assumptions about the relevance
or legal recognition of relationships in favor of a four-step process that would
interrogate from first principles, asking (1) whether the legislation pursues
a legitimate policy objective; (2) if so, whether relationships matter; (3) if
so, whether the policy objectives could be met by permitting individuals
to self-define their relevant relationships; and (4) if self-definition is not
appropriate, whether the legislation could be revised to capture the relevant
range of relationships."
As I will discuss further below, prior to the Law Commission's carefully
considered, principled methodological approach to determining whether, why,
14 Re Same-Sex Marriage (2004), 12 R.F.L. 6th 153, 246 D.L.R. 4th 193, 2004
CarswellNat 422 (Can.).
15 Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12 (Can.).
16 LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING
CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, at ix (2001).
17 Id. at 30-37.
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and how relationships matter in legislation, some provincial welfare legislation
had alreadyjettisoned "conjugality" or "sexuality" or "cohabitation" as relevant
indicia of spousal relationships, for other and sometimes less than principled
reasons. In Canada, the provinces have jurisdiction to enact legislation relating
to family property, child and spousal support, child custody, succession, child
welfare and adoption, and social assistance. As a result, there are ten provincial
and two territorial law regimes. Even so, there are more similarities than
differences between the provincial regimes.
Looking at Ontario, Canada's most populous province, one can see the
importance placed on the family, as well as a formal commitment to equality
within marriage, equitable sharing and settlement, partnerships, mutuality,
and gender neutrality, expressed by the preamble to its Family Law Act." Two
forms of spousal relationships are contemplated by the Ontario regime: The
provisions governing family property and matrimonial home extend only
to legally married spouses; but a more expansive definition is found later
in that part of the legislation that addresses spousal support. Here, "spouse"
includes both the legally married as well as any two persons who either have
cohabited continuously for a period of three years, or who have cohabited
in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive
parents of a child.19 And, although polygamy continues to be a criminal offense
in Canada, 20 the province of Ontario offers family law protection for the
purposes of family property and spousal support to a spouse of a marriage
"that is actually or potentially polygamous, if [the marriage] was celebrated
in a jurisdiction whose system of law regards it as valid." 2 1 "Step-parent"
adoption of children by lesbians and gay couples has been permitted since
1995, thanks to a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice.22 Importantly as
well, the Children ' Law Reform Act (CLRA) has abolished the concept of
illegitimacy, and while a mother and father have equal rights to custody of a
18 Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (Can.) states that:
Whereas it is desirable to encourage and strengthen the role of the family,
and whereas for that purpose it is necessary to recognize the equal position
of spouses as individuals within marriage and to recognize marriage as
a form of partnership and whereas in support of such recognition it is
necessary to provide in law for the orderly and equitable settlement affairs
of the spouses upon the breakdown of the partnership, and to provide for
other mutual obligations in family relationships, including the equitable
sharing by parents of responsibility for their children . . ..
19 Id. s. 29.
20 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 293 (Can.).
21 Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, s. 1(2) (Can.).
22 Re K., [1995] 23 O.R. 3d 679 (Can. Ont. Ct.).
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child, any person may apply for custody of or access to a child.23
In a groundbreaking decision in 2007, the Ontario Court of Appeal
expanded the content of law's family tent even further when it allowed the
appeal of a lesbian "social" parent who had applied for a declaration that she
was a mother of a child within the meaning of the CLRA, Part II, section 4,
which provides in part that:
(1) Any person having an interest may apply to a court for a declaration
that a male person is recognized in law to be the father of a child or
that a female person is the mother of a child.
(3) Where the court finds on the balance of probabilities that the
relationship of mother and child has been established, the court may
make a declaratory order to that effect.
This case involved a lesbian couple, their two year old child and the
child's biological father. AA sought to be recognized not only as a parent, but
as a mother of the child DD, whom she and CC, her partner and the child's
biological mother, were raising.24 Prior to the birth of DD, AA and CC had
been cohabiting as same-sex partners for eleven years.25 They had celebrated
their relationship in a secular commitment ceremony in 1992 attended by
more than one hundred guests. They had discussed the possibility of having
children, but had waited until their careers were more firmly established. By
1999, AA had been called to the Bar and was employed as a lawyer; CC had
secured an appointment as a university professor.
Having achieved this measure of security in their professional careers,
they turned their minds to having a child and agreed that CC would be the
biological mother. They also agreed that it "would be in their future child's
best interests to know his or her biological father and for the father to play an
active role in the child's life." 26 They entered into a discussion with a longtime
male friend, BB, a university professor, spouse to another woman, and father
of three children. AA, CC, and BB ultimately "made a mutual commitment
whereby AA and CC would be the primary custodial and decision-making
parents, but BB would also have an active and participatory role in the child's
23 Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-12, s. 21(1) (Can.).
24 A.(A.) v. B.(B.), (2007), 83 O.R. (3d) 561; 35 R.F.L.(6th) 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
25 A.(A) v. B.(B.), (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 371; 38 R.F.L. (5th) 1; (Can. Ont.
S.C.).
26 [2003] O.J. No. 1215 3.
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upbringing." 27 It is not clear whether BB's spouse and children formed part
of the consultation process and "mutual commitment."
DD was born on February 6, 2001. AA and CC regarded each other
as having equal status and responsibility in relation to the little boy. BB's
relationship to and involvement with DD and his lesbian parents was described
in the following terms by the trial judge:
BB visits the child twice a week. On Tuesdays, he has time with the
children independently of AA and CC. On Thursdays, he joins them
for a family dinner together which sometimes also involves his other
children and the woman with whom he cohabits ... .BB has not been
asked to provide any ongoing or regular financial support but he does
support the child informally and indirectly. All of the child's needs
are being met.28
However, AA wanted to be recognized as the child's mother. It would have
been possible for AA and CC to make ajoint application for AA to adopt the
child, but an adoption order would have resulted in the legal severing of the
child's formal legal relationship with one or other of the biological parents.29
It would have been open to the lesbian couple to make a joint application as
spouses for AA to adopt the child and thus formally and legally define both of
them as the child's parents, and thereby retain the parental dyadic unit. This,
however, would have required the father's consent. While such an adoption
would have been an "open" one, as the father was known and involved,
the adoption order would have resulted in the legal severance of the child's
relationship to the father, as is the case in all adoptions in Ontario, including
"step-parent" adoptions. It appears that he was not prepared to relinquish his
legal relationship to the child and, apparently and importantly, the lesbian
couple was not prepared to press him on this issue. Rather than create a lesbian
family, they felt the child needed a father.
AA's application at first instance was denied; however, she appealed to the
Ontario Court ofAppeal, where she experienced more success. The Court of
Appeal allowed her appeal and made the declaration that she sought. Thus,
as a result of the court's declaration under the CLRA, AA was held to be
DD's mother in addition to his biological mother, CC. BB's status remained
unchanged.
This case is clearly significant not simply for the apparently innovative,
apparently progressive legal result. On one reading, it might be observed that
27 Id. ( 4.
28 Id. IT 6-7.
29 Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O 1990, c. 11, s. 158(2) (Can.).
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the form of conventional legal parenthood has been transcended, the normative
dyad of mother and father de-centered, and a new form of family recognized.
However, it can be argued with equal force that the definition of "parent"
in many forms of Canadian family law legislation already contemplates a
broader range of parent-child relationships beyond biological mother and
father. These statutes provide that the definition of a parent of a child includes
any person who has demonstrated a settled intention to treat a child as a child
of his or her family (other than foster parents who are being remunerated for
their care-giving work 0) and that, in addition to a child's parent, "any other
person may apply to a court for an order respecting custody of or access to
the child or determining any aspect of the incidents of custody of the child."'
However, I argue for a deeper reading of the implications of this case of
the three parents, one that calls for an analysis of both the form and content
of the social and legal relations. It is not enough simply to widen the family
law tent or challenge the normative dyad either as parents, as mother/father,
or spouses. Surely, a closer reading and analysis of the content of the legal
recognition yields a still more entrenched ideological formation - that of
patriarchy: the importance of the idea of a father (although not necessarily the
material support, as in this case). What can be a more fundamental expression
of patriarchal ideology than the expressed belief of lesbian parents that
their child's best interests require not simply a man, but a father in his life?
Thus, although heralded as a victory for the lesbian parents, this case also
represented a victory for the man whose importance as father was accepted
without question by the lesbians even before the child was conceived, and
long before they went to court.
A. The Context and Form of (Family) Law's Mediation of Patriarchal
Relations
This Article revisits and renews my commitment to an approach to family
law that has long informed my work, one that maintains that an historically-
informed analysis of the form and content of law and of social and familial
relations is important:
The language of gender neutrality now saturates family law so
thoroughly that it is easy to forget how until recently the key figures
in the legal relations of (nuclear) family law were understood to be
only legally married husbands, wives and their infants... . Historically,
married women, widows, common law wives, deserted wives, and
30 See, e.g., Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 1 (Can.).
31 Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, s. 21(1) (Can.).
2812012]
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single mothers have been dealt with differently at law. The closer
one gets to property, the tighter the legal definition of spouse and the
heightened significance of legal marriage.3 2
Three premises thus inform my analysis." First, despite myriad fault lines
and cracks, commitment to the idealized model of the nuclear family and,
to a certain extent, to its needs, informed the legislation and social policy
of the pre-Keynesian welfare state. Second, one of the innovations of both
prewar and more notably postwar social policy in Canada was the introduction
of a handful of universal social programs that no longer exist in the form
in which they were introduced, if at all.34 Third, and most importantly, the
postwar social policy initiatives in Canada neither supplanted nor replaced the
patriarchal nuclear family as the primary site of obligation and responsibility
for family members.
The first wave of mother's allowances and social assistance programs
was designed to compensate for patriarchal losses or failures rather than to
transform or alter the family's shape or place." As Mary McIntosh observed
in an early feminist intervention on the relationship between women and
the capitalist state, the early British welfare state understood (or seemed
to understand) that the nuclear family could not by itself provide all the
services required to reproduce a healthy population, such as education and
healthcare, to cite but two examples." Thus, state support for the nuclear
family simultaneously celebrated it, insisted upon its centrality within society,
and recognized its limits and frailties, not least that it could not deliver all
that was expected of it.
The family and familial relations have been the site and subject of myriad
legislative instruments and social practices. The experience of poor families
32 Shelley A.M. Gavigan, Equal Families, Equal Parents, Equal Spouses, Equal
Marriage: The Case ofthe Missing Patriarch, 33 SuP. CT. L. REv. 317, 342 (2006)
(reprinted in DIMINISHING RETURNS: INEQUALITY AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 317 (Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers eds., 2006)).
33 See, e.g., Gavigan & Chunn, From Mother's Allowance, supra note 2.
34 See Pat Armstrong, The Welfare State as History, in THE WELFARE STATE IN
CANADA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 52 (Raymond B. Blake, Penny E. Bryden &
J. Frank Strain eds., 1997) (for example, Old Age Pensions Act, R.S.C. 1927, c.
156; Family Allowance Act, 1944, S.C. 1944-45, c. 40; Old Age Security Act,
S.C. 1951, c. 181).
35 Gavigan, Paradise Lost, supra note 11, at 607-08; Gavigan & Chunn, From
Mother 's Allowance, supra note 2.
36 Gavigan & Chunn, From Mother 's Allowance, supra note 2.
37 McIntosh, supra note 2.
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seldom calls to mind the idealized notion that one's home is one's castle.
Rhetorical commitment to familial privacy is asserted and matched by
circumscription. Rather than being relegated to the realm of an inviolable
"private," families and the women in them have always straddled the
ideological "public/private" divide.38 For the poor and the marginalized, the
implications have been complex, uneven and contradictory. The poor family,
long regarded as a site of social dysfunction and source of social problems, has
been both hyper-regulated and surveilled, and ignored and under-supported.
Recently, Canadian feminist socio-legal scholars have begun to analyze
neo-liberalism and social conservatism - the Scylla and Charybdis of
contemporary Canadian social and economic policy - through interrogations
of the premises, practices and implications of the "public/private divide" and
"privatization." 9 While the areas of law and policy addressed have been
wide - taxation law, 4 0 immigration law,41 pensions and securities regulation,42
child welfare law, 43 labor law,44 health law and policy45 - my particular focus
in the next section of the Article is on feminist analyses of the discourses
and gendered implications of "privatization" in the context of family law
and social welfare legislation, respectively.46 In particular, I ask whether a
38 Gavigan & Chunn, From Mother's Allowance, supra note 2, at 737.
39 See, e.g., SUSAN B. BOYD, CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM,
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (1997); BRENDA COSSMAN & JUDY FUDGE, PRIVATIZATION,
LAW AND THE CHALLENGES TO FEMINISM (2002).
40 Lisa Philipps, Tax Law and Social Reproduction: The Gender ofFiscal Policy in
an Age ofPrivatization, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM
41 (Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., 2002); Claire F.L. Young, Taxing
Times for Lesbians and Gay Men: Equality at What Cost?, 17 DALHOUSIE L.J.
533 (1994).
41 Audrey Macklin, Public Entrance/Private Member, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND
THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM, supra note 40, at 218.
42 Mary Condon, Privatizing Pension Risk: Gender Law, and Financial Markets,
in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM, supra note 40, at 128.
43 Marlee Kline, Blue Meanies in Alberta: Tory Tactics and the Privatization of
Child Welfare, in CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE, supra note 39, at 330.
44 Judy Fudge, From Segregation to Privatization: Equality, the Law, and Women
Public Servants, 1908-2001, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO
FEMINISM, supra note 40, at 86.
45 Joan Gilmour, Creeping Privatization in Health Care: Implications for Women
As the State Redraws Its Role, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO
FEMINISM, supra note 40, at 41.
46 See, e.g., SUSAN B. BOYD, CHILD CUSTODY, LAW AND WOMEN'S WORK 215-18
(2002); Susan B. Boyd & Claire F.L. Young, Feminism, Law and Public Policy:
Family Feuds and Taxing Times, 42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 545 (2004); Brenda
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"tectonic shift"47 can in fact be demonstrated.
B. Something New for the Family? Privatization/Reprivatization
The nature and implications of various judicial and legislative victories,
notably in relation to the extension of the definition of spouse and relationship
recognition more generally, have been subject to critical scrutiny and
interrogation at every instance, level, and turn.4 8 The triumph of neo-
conservative and neo-liberal discourse that now informs the social and
economic policies of most governments in the global West and North and
the coincidence of the rise and success of same-sex relationship recognition
and marriage campaigns figure prominently in the critiques and have led to
the assertion of some causal claims.
The discourse of the primacy of the private, or its market, as "the driving
force in the economy," 49 has shaped and informed the policies of Canadian
governments since the election of Brian Mulroney's Conservative government
in 1984. Since Mulroney's early, rather conventional pronouncement quoted
above, Judy Fudge and Brenda Cossman argue that privatization has come
to "signify" - no less than a "tectonic shift in public policy"" of the liberal
state: "Privatization has come to represent a fundamental shift not only in
government policies but also in the balance of public and private power,
both globally and nationally. It also exemplifies the coincidence of social
conservative and family values rhetoric and the neo-liberal goals of self-
reliance in public policy."" Eschewing a conceptualization of privatization
as either simple or straightforward, Fudge and Cossman argue that the
process involves "a reconfiguration of the form of state regulation, rather
than [simply] deregulation"" and a "fundamental retrenchment of the state
Cossman, Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-Conservative Visions of the
Reprivatization Project, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM,
supra note 40, at 169.
47 Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman, Introduction: Privatization, Law and the
Challenge to Feminism, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM,
supra note 40, at 3.
48 See, e.g., Boyd & Young, supra note 46; Cossman, supra note 46; Gavigan,
Paradise Lost, supra note 11; Gavigan, supra note 32.
49 Fudge & Cossman, supra note 47, at 3 (quoting former Canadian Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney).
50 Id at 3-4.
51 Id. at 4.
52 Id. at 19.
[Vol. 13:271284
Something Old, Something New?
in social reproduction, leaving families and charities to shoulder a greater
part of the burden for people.""
Their more complex view of privatization suggests a constellation of
strategies: reregulation, reprivatization, individualization, commodification,
familialization, delegation, and depoliticization.54 Fudge and Cossman speak
of "once public goods and services" which are being "reconstituted as private"
(in the case of reprivatization), "reconstituted as naturally located within the
realm of the family" (as in the case of familialization), or "reconstituted as
market goods and services" (in the case of commodification)." However, in
the context of family and welfare law, this notion of "once public goods and
services" does raise the question of precisely when the golden age of "once"
was - a question that, as Dorothy Chunn and I have argued elsewhere,
really needs to be answered and demonstrated historically rather than asserted
rhetorically.16
Does this conceptualization of "reprivatization" and of "familialization" as
a central strategy of privatization in the current context capture an actual shift
in both official discourse and policy? Does it actually capture the discursive
and policy shift in social assistance law?" While the "de-famililializing" nature
of the neo-liberal privatization agenda is acknowledged," familialization
appears to be of more consequence. In order to bring "reprivatization" and
a (reconstituted) familialization into their theory of privatization, Fudge and
Cossman are required to incorporate a neo-conservative commitment to the
traditions and values of the patriarchal family into the privatizing strategy.
But, the result of adding the fabric of neo-conservative family values to
privatization, or even "reprivatization," is not illustrative of the complexity
of the process. They are akin to hand-me-down clothes, often a poor fit.
In my view, demonstrative evidence of a "tectonic shift" in state policy
with respect to the family requires an analysis of the nature of the shift in neo-
liberal state policy - awayfrom support for the family - in which a form
of "defamilialization" can be seen as one of the key strategies of neo-liberal
privatization and its legislative instruments." Within feminist discourses
of privatization, the welfare state has been restructured along leaner and
53 Id. at 18.
54 Id. at 20-21.
55 Id.
56 See Gavigan & Chunn, From Mother's Allowance, supra note 2.
57 Cossman, supra note 46.
58 Id. at 211.
59 See Janet Mosher, Intimate Intrusions: Welfare Regulation and Women's Personal
Lives, in THE LEGAL TENDER OF GENDER, supra note 2, at 165, 167.
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meaner lines, and the focus of welfare policy has shifted such that the state is
"reinforcing certain private familial responsibilities for women's poverty ...
while diminishing public societal commitment to alleviating that poverty."o
With respect to family law in particular, Canadian feminist family
law scholar Susan Boyd has argued that the discourse of privatization is
"currently infusing law and social policy in Canada."6' For Boyd, three
themes of privatization may be found in the area of child custody62: first, the
reinforcement within child custody law of women's privatized responsibility
for childcare within family units, and in particular, women's unpaid private
responsibility for caring labor; second, the invisibility of women's care-giving
labor which is privatized within the family; and, finally, the fact that, in the
area of women's personal lives, "mothers who deviate from the norm often
feel obliged to hide or privatize their non-conforming life choice." 63
There are different meanings attached to privatization here. However, to
reiterate a question that I have asked elsewhere, how, if at all, do any of these
three themes illustrate privatization?64 The discourse of privatization simply
does not allow one to analyze the ideological nature of the "private" family
or the "public/private" split, and the very real fact that primary responsibility
for family and childcare has always been primarily "private" and gendered. In
my view, the discourse of privatization has stronger resonance for women's
child-caring in the contexts of healthcare policy (the shifts to homecare,
the cuts to hospitals) and education policy (with cuts to early childhood,
kindergarten and after school programs, and the erosion of public education
through, among other things, tuition tax deductibility for private schools,
to cite the most obvious few). In sum, Boyd's analysis of the history and
complexities of child custody law and law reform does not require the new
discursive mode of privatization, although clearly privatization affects her
areas of concern in a host of other care-giving contexts. Surely the discourse
of "privatization" sits uneasily in the context of marriage and familial relations
more generally, resting as it does on the very real material foundations of
gender inequality within patriarchal familial relations.
As I have suggested above, twentieth-century family law reform initiatives
introduced tentative, if uneven, inhibitions of the explicitly patriarchal premises
60 Cossman, supra note 46, at 173 (citing Susan B. Boyd, (Re)Placing the State:
Family, Law, and Oppression, 9 CAN. J.L. & Soc'Y 39 (1994)).
61 BOYD, supra note 46, at 215.
62 Id. at 318-19.
63 Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
64 Shelley A.M. Gavigan, Book Review, 20 CAN. J. FAM. L. 229, 237 (2003)
(reviewing BOYD, supra note 46).
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of nineteenth and early twentieth-century family law. 65 The inevitability and
desirability of marriage and family may be celebrated socially and culturally,
but family law reform has also been informed, at least implicitly, by the
understanding that marriage and cohabitation involve economic disadvantage,
the visibility of which most often only becomes apparent or acknowledged
at the end of relationships.66 While it is now almost axiomatic to invoke a
domino-like causal relationship flowing from separation and divorce to the
feminization ofpoverty, a more compelling argument points to the feminization
of poverty within marriage and the family - derived from and reinforced by
the gendered nature of property ownership, labor, and wealth accumulation,
and replicated and reproduced by the gendered division of domestic and
childcare labor within the home.
To its credit, Canadian family law legislation invokes the language of
disadvantage, burden and hardship in relation to familial relationships, not
simply at the point and in the aftermath of their breakdown. Canada's federal
Divorce Act identifies the objectives of a spousal support order as recognition
of the economic advantage or disadvantage of the spouses arising from
marriage or its breakdown, the apportioning of financial consequences arising
from caring for children of the marriage, relieving the economic hardship
arising from marriage breakdown, and the promotion of self-sufficiency within
a reasonable period of time." The Ontario Family Law Act's itemization
of the purposes of spousal support orders similarly includes the sharing
of the economic burden of child support, relief of financial hardship, and
recognition of each spouse's contribution to the relationship and the economic
consequences of the relationship. 68
In the next Part I demonstrate both the ongoing analytic relevance and
material expressions of patriarchal ideology, even in contexts where, at first
glance, there may be no obvious patriarch (as the litigants AA and CC might
claim of their situation) - as in the case of lone parent welfare mothers, or
where there is a clear patriarch - as in the case of polygamy. I also critically
interrogate the application of the discourse of privatization in family law, in
particular in relation to the legal victories regarding the "spouse in the house"
65 See, e.g., BOYD, supra note 46; CAROL SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE
AND THE REPRODUCTION OF PATRIARCHAL RELATIONS (1984).
66 SMART, supra note 65.
67 Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3, s. 15 (Can.). In section 15.2(4), the act itemizes
factors to be considered in the making of a support order, including the functions
performed by each spouse during cohabitation and any agreement or arrangement
relating to support.
68 Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, s. 33(8) (Can.).
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in welfare law and same-sex relationship recognition; in particular, I take issue
with the characterization of "privatized lesbians" in family law. Through the
exemplars of lesbian spouses, polygamous wives, and lone parent mothers
on welfare, I demonstrate both the limits of a narrow focus on privatization,
especially one that does not simultaneously attend to the patriarchal content
of the privatized forms and sites, and the continuing importance of a critical
engagement with patriarchal ideology itself.
II. WOMEN AT THE OUTSKIRTS OF FAMILY LAW
A. The "Privatized" Lesbians of Family Law
In the landmark Canadian case, M v. H., the lesbian applicant argued that
the opposite sex requirement of the definition of spouse for the purposes of
spousal support (but not family property) violated her equality rights under
the Canadian Charter ofRights.69 Her claim was resisted by both her former
partner as well as the government, which sought to protect its legislation
from Charter challenge and any expansion of its coverage. Cossman argues
that the result in this case has contributed to the construction of "privatized
lesbians.""o Even though she acknowledges that the case was not argued in
these terms or on this issue, and there was no suggestion that the applicant
M had required or sought social assistance after the separation, Cossman
argues that the antidiscrimination sex equality argument converged with "neo-
liberal discourses of formal equality and privatization" because the court in
one paragraph "placed considerable emphasis on the goal of 'reducing the
strain on the public purse' by 'shifting the financial burden away from the
government and on to those partners with the capacity to provide support
for dependent spouses."' 7 1 Thus, M. v. H. emerges as a victory for "neo-
liberalism in the judicial form."72 But it can be argued with equal force that
M. was arguing for the expansion of herpublic rights, in the form of family
law legislation. Surely a real instance of "neo-liberalism in the judicial form"
would have rejected M.'s claim, leaving her in the (private) realm of contract
law, making and proving a private agreement with her domestic partner."
69 M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
70 Cossman, supra note 46.
71 Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 190.
73 Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization ofHeterosexuality, 73 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1169 (1995-1996); Martha Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual
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The discourse of privatization has been applied within family law by
feminists who are both wary and critical of the "victories" achieved by and
on behalf of women seeking to obtain spousal and child support from men.
Anything that involves the enforcement of a patriarchal familial relation now
is characterized as an instance of privatization by family law. If individual
men are required to pay child support for children to whom they stand in
loco parentis, or to their former spouses, this is characterized as an instance
of privatization. Why privatization, not familialization, one wonders? Has
privatization become a readily invoked "unexamined vocabulary co-existing
with other vocabularies?" 4 If this is an instance of privatization, what
vocabulary or discourse can be invoked to capture the alternative result: the
"privatization" of financial resources and wealth in the hands of men within
and at the end of marriage? The fact that family law legislation structures
and frames the legal obligations, responsibilities and expectations of family
members, including a right to financial support, is taken to mean that efforts
to enforce - or extend - those rights and obligations are part of a ploy to
avoid demands being made on the state. It is important to remember here
that the primary responsibility for economic support of family members has
always rested with the family, in particular, with the male breadwinner.
Interestingly, in this discourse, privatization is deployed primarily in
the context of support and child custody - not family property, arguably
the primary site of private (male) wealth in families. More recently, this
critique has been extended to "non-patriarchal" relations. With the success of
various campaigns and Charter-based litigation for the recognition of same-
sex relationships, some feminist and queer legal theorists have argued that
the very campaign for the extension of the definition of spouse and equal
marriage reflects a "privatizing" strategy or, perhaps more aptly, a strategy that
serves the interests of privatization. The concept of the "private" - and most
certainly "patriarchal" - has been displaced by the mantra of privatization.
Finally, one surely has to ask where the "once public goods and services"
are in the history of same-sex relationships. Surely, no group has been more
privatized historically than lesbians - not even subjected to the kind of public
denunciation associated with gay men through criminalization of their sexual
expression and activity.
Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1107
(1995-1996).
74 Jock Young, From Left Idealism to the Rule ofLaw, in CAPITALISM AND THE RULE
OF LAw 12 (Bob Fine ed., 1979) (attributing the quoted phrase to E.P. Thompson
in another context).
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While there is no patriarch in these cases of ostensibly privatized lesbians,
the discourse of privatization has been extended from contexts in which it
is used instead of "private" and "patriarchal." In neither instance, does the
application of the discourse of privatization in familial contexts - same-sex
or heterosexual - permit an analysis of the actual social relations and social
policies involved. And, as I have demonstrated above, one need not have a
patriarch in one's home to have a patriarch in one's head.
B. Patriarchy's Non-Nuclear Outskirts: Polygamous Families
"Family law and policy in Canada are now characterized by a flexible
pluralism that reflects the acceptance of multiple traditions and changing
family forms.""
Calls for the repeal of the offense of polygamy, long housed and seldom
prosecuted as a criminal offense in Canada,"6 have been ignored by the Federal
Parliament." Polygamy's retention in the Criminal Code has again come
under scrutiny and its outcast legal status has been the subject of recent
debate in Canada, sparked in part by rethinking of the merits of its continued
criminalization by some feminists," who have taken a fresh look both at the
criminal law and polygamy's supposed "mischief," 9 and at the self-evidence
of its harms for women and children. Recently, polygamy has entered into
mainstream popular culture in North America, thanks to HBO's television
series, Big Love," and the possibly more accessible reality television series,
Sister Wives."
In scholarship, as well, differing accounts of the lives and experiences
of women and children in polygamous relationships are appearing in forms
75 IV VANIER INST. OF THE FAM., FAMILIES COUNT: PROFILING CANADA's FAMILIES, at
xix (2010).
76 See, e.g., LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER 42: BIGAMY
(1985).
77 See NICHOLAS BALA ET AL., AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF POLYGAMY: LEGAL AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA 28 (2005) (a report prepared for Status of
Women Canada); see also Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same Sex Marriage
Allies or Adversaries Within the Same Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559, 589 (2008).
78 See, e.g., Bailey, Baines, Amani & Kaufman, supra note 7; Drummond, supra
note 6.
79 Drummond, supra note 6.
80 Big Love (HBO 2006).
81 Sister Wives (TLC 2010).
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beyond the television screen. Angela Campbell, a Canadian legal academic,
has undertaken empirical research with women followers in the Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints, located in the community of
Bountiful, British Columbia.8 2 The community has been in the news over the
last few years, following the British Columbia government's unsuccessful
attempt to prosecute two avowed, self-proclaimed polygamist menA3 The
government referred the question whether the criminal offense violates
Canada's religious freedom guarantees to a judge of the British Columbia
superior court, and this matter is currently being argued.84
Some of the women of the Bountiful community agreed to be interviewed
by Campbell, motivated in part it seems by a desire to have "their" side of
the story of polygamy told. For her part, Campbell also sees her research
as part of a larger scholarly project of "accessing and giving credence to
women's varied experiences" and providing a balance to media accounts
and secondary sources where these women are "often cast as exploited and
damaged."85 She writes:
Women in this community might appear to be subjugated to their
husbands and to the male leaders of the community: unlike the men,
they are precluded from having plural spouses, and they do not wield
public political leadership of the group. But is it possible that a look
at this communityfrom within might deliver a different account of its
power structures? That is, might we see polygamy as something other
than the "nadir of women's status and autonomy". . . ?8
In particular, Campbell asks, "might we find [that] women exercise agency
in shaping the way their marriages, their families, and the community look
and operate?"" Campbell maintains that she is not suggesting that women's
82 Angela Campbell, Wives' Tales: Reflecting on Research in Bountiful, 23 CAN.
J.L. & Soc'Y 121 (2008).
83 Petti Fong, Polygamy Charges Tossed Out, THE TORONTO STAR, Sept. 24, 2009,
http://www.thestar.com/article/700192.
84 The Canadian Press, Polygamy Law Persecute Bountiful, B.C.: Lawyer, CTV NEWS
(Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.ctvbc.ctv.ca/servlet/an/locaUCTVNews/20101124/
bcpolygamy 101124; see also Olivia Ward, Polygamy: Multiple Choice for
Men, No Choice for Women, THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 27, 2010, http://www.
thestar.com/news/world/article/897904. On November 23, 2011, the British
Columbia Supreme Court upheld the constitiotionality of the polygamy offence,
Criminal Code, B.C.S.C. 2011, S. 293 (Can.).
85 Campbell, supra note 82, at 123.
86 Id. at 126 (footnote omitted).
87 Id.
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perspectives should be accepted without critique; however, in her "counter-
narrative" of "Bountiful Voices,"" one arguably encounters but modest
expressions of any critique.
Research which provides insight into the voices and reflections on the
experiences of "outsiders" is always to be welcomed, especially when those
voices are seldom if ever heard in law. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to engage with every aspect of Campbell's research at Bountiful; my primary
interest is to interrogate the counter-narratives she presents to determine
whether the dominant narrative, from which she wishes to distance her
research, may be found in them. For instance, some of the women interviewed
make it clear that they were part of "placement marriages" and "assigned" to
husbands pursuant to arrangements made by their fathers before they reached
the age of sixteen:
Well, we had placement marriages. And so when my father told me
had said that, that he wanted me to marry a man from Canada, I just
said "Why?" I'd never been to Canada. It's so far away and ... I didn't
really want to be a plural wife. But I didn't want to disappoint my
father, who was everything. ... I started screaming "I'm not gonna
do it!" And I had that choice and he was just so disappointed and that
was it. I had that choice. I didn't have to. Then I decided that I didn't
want to disappoint him. I really respected him.8 9
"Underage marriage" emerges as a "past custom";90 however, some of their
daughters nonetheless still appear to experience "peer pressure" to marry in
their teens. 91
Accounts of sexuality, contraception and reproduction were "intriguing." 92
One of the women told Campbell:
I have never had anyone say to me, "You shouldn't use birth control."
But it's definitely implied. And it's, I don't think, I mean talking to my
own husband, he would never feel like that was appropriate. Because,
I guess it's just not the natural thing. It's not what, I guess, we were
designed to use or whatever. At the same time though, I think, a lot
of women are not really able to communicate their feelings when it
88 Angela Campbell, Bountiful Voices, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 183 (2009).
89 Id. at 195 (Participant #10).
90 Id. at 200.
91 Id. at 201.
92 Id. at 204.
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comes to [saying]: "Okay, I've had ten children, and I probably have
what I can take care of."9 3
Campbell's informants referred to sexual relations with their husbands as
"mating": "When for example, a wife may feel that her husband would like
to mate with her she says, 'No, Sweetheart, I'm sorry ... "'9 This informant
elaborated: "I said [to my husband], 'You'll have to cope with it, because I
can't, I can't mate with you right now.' You know? Even though I was nursing,
I just, I [couldn't] take the risk."95
Another counter-narrative emerges in the discussion of the plural wives'
access to education and employment. Here, the apparent lack of financial
support provided by the polygamous husbands gets recast as financial
independence of the women. Campbell observes that "the administration
of family finances was a particular area where participants indicated their
assertion of control and independence" 96 : "I make my own money and pay
my own bills. I don't really give him any, [and] I don't take much money,
because that way I'm not dependent."97
Another woman described the approach in her plural marriage:
We [the wives] will sit together with him and figure out which bills
have to be paid, and who can help out at that time. We do a big camping
trip every summer as a family. Each mother donates towards that. But
it's easier if each mother worries about her own children's needs. I
mean, it's too big for the whole family to worry about every child....
But then for the big things like bills, like the power bill, then we get
together and worry that through.98
It is also the case that the women in Bountiful celebrate the companionship
enjoyed by the sister-wives and all their children. And, while it would be a
very poor feminist who would deny the importance of respecting these and
other first-person accounts, one surely has to inquire about the extent to which
these accounts are consonant with either contemporary principles and values
of family law in Canada - in which marriage is seen as a partnership premised
on equality of the spouses - or to the aspersed "dominant narrative" sought
to be countered. On their own terms, and in their own words, worrisome
93 Id at 204 (Participant #9).
94 Id.
95 Id at 205.
96 Id at 213.
97 Id at 207 (Participant #17).
98 Id at 213 (Participant #16).
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forms of substantive inequality and patriarchal privilege (and irresponsibility)
are found.
Thus, while some feminists in Canada argue that the polygamous family
form is not necessarily the site of subordination of women, and that some
forms of "sisterhood" and agency can be found, this all occurs within the
context of a particular expression of patriarchal relations. But, in Bountiful,
it is not clear what material support, if any, the patriarchs provide for their
children; it is not even clear that they pay for the electricity they consume.
C. Poor Lone Parent Mothers: Life and Law in the "Non-Conjugal"
Outskirts of Family Law
In the 2006 Canadian census, lone parent families were reported to account
for 1,414,100 families in Canada, or just under sixteen percent; the majority
(80.1%) of these were comprised of women and their children. 99 The high
poverty rates for lone parent mothers in Canada are a matter of public record,' 0o
and a great many of these families rely on forms of social assistance for their
survival. Less known and appreciated is the fact that almost half of these
mothers and their children derive their incomes from the mother's earnings,
not social assistance.' 0
One of the most challenging issues for poor mothers is the vexing
relationship between family law and welfare law. For poor women conjugality
and cohabitation takes on a whole new meaning and significance, which
arguably lie at the heart of family law and welfare law in many contexts.102
One of the longstanding indicia of a conjugal relationship is cohabitation;
indeed, Canadian case law has long held that a conjugal relationship can
be ended by "living separate and apart" - which within family law can be
found to occur even when spouses are living in the same home. 03 In other
words, it is possible within family law and, importantly, for divorce law that
spouses be found to be living separated and apart, and hence not in a conjugal
99 STATISTICS CANADA, FAMILY PORTRAIT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CANADIAN
FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS IN 2006, at 15 (2007).
100 See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WELFARE, WELFARE INCOMES 2002 (2003).
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Shiri Regev, Revealing Realities Beyond the Formal Law: Untold
Stories of Israeli Single Mothers Living on Welfare (May 2006) (unpublished
LLM. thesis, Stanford University), available at https://www.law.stanford.edu/
publications/dissertationstheses/diss/RegevShiri-tft2006.pdf (analyzing Israeli
welfare law). I am grateful to the author for permission to cite her work.
103 In Ontario, the leading case is Moldowich v. Pettinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. 2d. 376
(Can. Ont. D.C.).
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relationship, while still living under the same roof But, as women on welfare
know, the poor family can be dissolved for the purposes of family law whilst
being regarded as intact for the purpose of social assistance.
One of the longest standing and most controversial issues in Canadian
welfare law is the history of the "spouse in the house" legislation.'04 Surely,
no aspect of welfare law has been subjected to more intense critical feminist
scrutiny and analysis than has the spouse in the house - and the commitment
to patriarchal premises of family and child support it represented.' In 1986,
Canadian feminist legal advocates believed they had made history, and indeed
they had. One of the first areas of law challenged for violating the equality
guarantees of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was the "spouse in the
house" regulation in Ontario's Family Benefits Act.10 6 In an historic settlement,
the provincial government agreed, for the first time ever, that the definition of
spouse in welfare law should track the definition of spouse in family law. For
women on welfare, this meant that if they began to cohabit with a man who
was not the father of their children, he would not be deemed to be a spouse
until the period of their cohabitation met the three year period provided under
the Family Law Act.' 7 In other words, during the period when he did not
have a legally enforceable obligation to provide financial support to her, or
to her children, he could not be brought in as a spouse in the social assistance
context. Additionally, and in the spirit of respecting and protecting the privacy
of women on welfare, the regulations also provided that sexual factors could
not be relied upon in determining whether the man was a welfare mother's
104 As Regev, supra note 102, has demonstrated, it may also be "spouses in the
house" in the context of polygamous families, such as the Bedouin in Israel.
105 See, e.g., MARGARET LITTLE, No CAR, No RADIO, No LIQUOR PERMIT: THE MORAL
REGULATION OF SINGLE MOTHERS IN ONTARIO, 1920-1997 (1998); JANET MOSHER,
PATRICIA EVANS, Jo-ANNE BOULDING & NANCY VANDERPLAATS, WALKING ON
EGGSHELLS: ABUSED WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES OF ONTARIO'S WELFARE SYSTEM (2004),
available at http://osgoode.yorku.ca/osgmedia.nsf/0/2930D46447IB479F852
5709A0053CEB6/$FILE/walking%20on%20eggshells%20final%20report.pdf;
JAMES STRUTHERS, THE LIMITS OF AFFLUENCE: WELFARE IN ONTARIO, 1920-1970, at
1 (1994); Margaret Little, A Litmus Test for Democracy: The Impact of Ontario
Welfare Changes on Single Mothers, 66 STUD. POL. ECON. 9 (2001); Melodie
Mayson, Ontario Works and Single Mothers: Redefining 'Deservedness and the
Social Contract,' 34 J. CAN. STUD. 89 (1999); Veronica Strong-Boag, Wages
for Housework: Mothers'Allowances and the Beginnings of Social Security in
Canada, 14 J. CAN. STUD. 24 (1979).
106 Family Benefits Act Regulations, R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 318, s. 1(1)(d)(iv), amended
by 0. Reg. 589/87, s. (1) (Can.).
107 Family Law Act, S.O. 1986; see also LITTLE, supra note 105, at 153-56.
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spouse. In other words, the fact that a woman might be sexually involved with
a man was not to be considered. However, and paradoxically, neither could
the absence of a sexual relationship be relied upon to deny the existence of
a spousal relationship.
In 1995, as Dorothy Chunn and I have discussed elsewhere, Ontario's
welfare laws were dramatically restructured and reshaped by the newly
elected Conservative government.'os The very first acts of the Conservative
government included a twenty-two percent across the board cut to social
assistance benefits, reducing the incomes of welfare recipients to further
depths beneath the poverty line. Single mothers on welfare, for instance,
saw their incomes drop to fifty-eight percent of the national low income
cutoffs, Canada's "poverty line."' 09 A new, expanded definition of "spouse"
was introduced which provided that an individual who lived with a welfare
recipient could be found to be a spouse, even though by any other (family
law) definition of spouse there would be no recognized familial relationship
or support obligation. In the immediate aftermath of the redefinition of spouse,
ten thousand welfare mothers (and their dependent children) had their welfare
benefits terminated for this reason alone; seventy-eight percent of welfare
recipients whose benefits were terminated as a result of the new definition
were mothers."0
These mothers and their dependent children were left without recourse
either to social assistance (as long as they continued to reside with the man
who was providing no financial assistance to the household) or to legally
enforceable support obligations, because the "spouses" who had caused their
disentitlement to welfare were not legal spouses for any other purpose. Despite
the legally discursive construction of "spouse," the primary purpose and effect
of the expanded definition of spouse was to remove these women and children
from the welfare rolls - to terminate their benefits - not to relegate them
to the care and support of a husband/father.
Following a successful challenge to the new definition of spouse,"' which
saw it struck down, the government responded by a modest extension of the
"grace period" to three months, but in a clear effort to resist importing a family
108 Chunn & Gavigan, supra note 11; see also MOSHER, EVANS, BOULDING &
VANDERPLAATS, supra note 105.
109 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WELFARE, supra note 100, at 28 tbl. 2.1.
110 As discussed below, the Ontario Court of Appeal ultimately struck down
this provision as a violation of the welfare mothers' equality rights under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, see Falkiner v. Ontario, [2002] 59
OR. 3d 481 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
111 Id.
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law interpretation of "cohabitation" or "living separate and apart" in the same
home, the government widened the definition and closed the door to family
law jurisprudence. The definition of spouse no longer requires cohabitation,
but simply co-residence in the same dwelling house:
"[S]pouse", in relation to an applicant or recipient, means,
(c) a person who has an obligation to support the applicant or recipient
or any of his or her dependants under section 30 or 31 of the Family
Law Act, whether or not there is a domestic contract or other agreement
between the person and the applicant or recipient whereby they purport
to waive or release such obligation to support, or
(d) a person who has been residing in the same dwelling place as the
applicant or recipient for a period of at least three months, if,
(i) the extent of the social and familial aspects of the relationship
between the two persons is consistent with cohabitation, and
(ii) the extent of the financial support provided by one person to the
other or the degree of financial interdependence between the two
persons is consistent with cohabitation.
(2) For the purpose of the definition of "spouse," sexual factors shall
not be investigated or considered in determining whether or not a
person is a spouse. 112
Assessing the import of the broad definition of spouse in welfare law,
with resultant restrictions on access to benefits, Cossman has argued that
"[f]amily law is displacing social welfare as the primary financial source for
persons without market incomes.""3 This assertion requires close critical
interrogation in two important respects. It implies that social assistance ever
provided adequate financial support for families without access to market
incomes, and that social assistance actually provided an alternative to family-
based support.114 The historical record of the legislation does not support this
112 0. Reg. 134/98 under Ontario Works Act, S.O. 1997, c. 25 (Can.).
113 Cossman, supra note 46, at 173 (emphasis added).
114 In the province of Ontario, the Ontario Works (OW) rate for a single mother with
one child is approximately $800 per month; in addition, this mother is eligible to
receive the Child Tax Credit (CTC) under the program that replaced the Family
Allowance Plan. The stated objective of the CTC, as a "targeted" program, is
to assist low income families with children. However, the CTC (approximately
$150 per child) is regarded as income by OW and is deducted from the benefits.
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claim;"' and there is simply no empirical evidence that in the current context
family law is doing what is claimed here. The enforcement of a child or spousal
support obligation seldom replaces social assistance. Usually, it supports the
government but not the mother, because if she is on assistance, her monthly
benefits are deducted by the amount of support received. Neither form of
financial support ever really meets the needs of a woman and her children.
The Keynesian approach to social policy and the family neither attempted
nor sought to dislodge, or render public, the most significant source of women's
poverty and inequality in the labor force: their primary responsibility for the
care and wellbeing of their children. Despite the tentative expansion of the
welfare state in Canada, and the Canadian women's movement's tireless
efforts to place universal access to excellent childcare at the center of Canadian
public policy, responsibility for this most ideologically enduring aspect of
women's work (together with cleaning toilets) never shifted from women to
men, from mothers to fathers, from wives to husbands, from the "private"
to the "public." This "private familial" good and service never went public
in order to be "reprivatized" or "re-familialized" in the era of neo-liberalism
and privatization. The same can surely be said with respect to spousal and
child support, domestic labor within the home, responsibility for elder care,
and so on. Primary responsibility for "private" family relations has never not
been located within the family - discursively or otherwise."'
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored tensions and contradictions within and between
feminist socio-legal theorizing of ("private") family law and ("public") welfare
law as illuminated by the feminist engagement with privatization, same-sex
relationships, and polygamy. Throughout, I have attempted to demonstrate the
continued importance of attending to and engaging with patriarchal ideology
and patriarchal relations, even at the outskirts of family law - where one
might or might not find a resident patriarch.
The more apt description of the provincial's government's policy is "claw back."
The same is true for any child or spousal support payments that might be received
by a single mother. They too are deducted from the monthly OW benefits. Thus,
the poorest mothers in Ontario do not receive the benefit of programs that are
designed to alleviate child and family poverty.
115 Gavigan & Chunn, From Mothers'Allowance, supra note 2.
116 Id.
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Canada is a country of committed, if often serial, monogamists - same-
sex or straight."' Polyamorous relationships in Canada are statistically
insignificant."' So too are polygamous relationships, if ideologically more
potent; they clearly have captured the imagination of Canadian researchers and
crown prosecutors. The same might be said for same-sex couples. Enumerated
for the first time in 2006, the 2006 Census reported that same-sex couples
represented 0.6% of all couples in Canada that year.119 And, for all the vaunted
achievement of same-sex marriage in Canada, only 7,465 (sixteen percent)
of 45,345 same-sex couples counted in the 2006 census reported that they
were legally married.120 It is important to be attentive to the larger context in
which all these relationships exist.
Finally, for all the concerns about privatization - and there are many - it
is important to be attentive to the contradictory possibilities that nonetheless
may be offered by contract in family law. Reliance on contract, notably
"contracting out" of family law regimes, has become a prominent feature of
the Canadian family law landscape. While there are differing assessments of
the adverse implications for women of the ascendancy of contractual forms
(marriage contracts, separation agreements), the preponderance of feminist
family law scholars have raised serious concerns about the implications of
judicial blessings bestowed on husbands who seek to avoid/evade statutory
provisions premised on sharing and equity.121
117 STATISTICS CANADA, supra note 99, at 8 tbl. 1. The 2006 census "snapshot"
of Canadian families indicates that of 8,896,840 families in Canada, 84.1%
(7,482,775) were "couple families" (either legally married (68.6%) or common
law (15.5%)); the remaining 15.9% were comprised of female (12.7%) or male
(3.2%) lone parent families.
118 There is very little research into these forms of relationships in Canada. For a
study of polyamorists in the Bay Area of San Francisco, California, see Hadar
Aviram, Make Love, Not Law: Perceptions of the Marriage Equality Struggle
Among Polyamorous Activists, 7 J. BISEXUALITY 261, 269 (2008) (finding that the
polyamorous activists she interviewed were not particularly interested in securing
the right to marry; rather, they tended to eschew state or legal regulation, although
it must be noted that some acknowledged other forms of legal regulations, and
not so unconventional explanations for resisting marriage. In the words of one
ofAviram's female informants, "If I got married I'd lose my benefits as a single
mom." Another, a man named Roger, "a retired professional in his seventies," has
a number of girlfriends to whom he is "committed" but "manages his finances
by himself and prefers it that way.").
119 STATISTICS CANADA, supra note 99, at 12.
120 Id.; see also VANIER INST. OF THE FAM., supra note 75, at 40-41.
121 See, e.g., Boyd & Young, supra note 46; Brenda Cossman, A Matter ofDiference:
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However, provincial family law legislation does require, with slightly
varying tests, judicial oversight of domestic contracts, in order to ensure that
spouses who fail to disclose assets or who take advantage of the other spouse's
vulnerability are not able to rely upon them. Similarly, domestic contracts
cannot limit judicial oversight with respect to child support and the best
interests of dependent children, and finally, provisions of domestic contracts
which purport to impose chastity requirements will not be enforceable.' 22
There are many different legal familial contexts in which patriarchal claims
continue to be advanced within the context of rights claims. In what can
only be characterized as a distressing case from 2003, the Supreme Court of
Canada retreated to a breathtakingly formalistic interpretation of equality in
allowing the claim of a man who maintained his equality rights were violated
by legislation which permitted a mother to give the children born of their
short-term relationship her name only.'23 The male claimant was not the spouse
of the mother and did not have an active relationship with the children, and
indeed made little financial contribution to the children's care and upbringing.
Yet, for Justice Marie Deschamps, "a father's ability to include his particulars
on a child's birth registration and to contribute to the process of determining
the child's surname can reasonably be perceived to be modes of meaningful
participation in a child's life."1 2 4
More recently, however, Canada's Supreme Court stared down another
patriarchal claim cloaked in religious freedom when it enforced a civil
contract between a Jewish couple which had a religious aspect. The contract
in question was a "Consent to Corollary Relief," an agreement entered into
by the husband and wife in order to settle their matrimonial dispute at the
time of their civil divorce. One of the commitments they had made to each
other in the agreement was to appear before a rabbinical court to obtain a
get. The husband then refused to do so, and maintained his intransigence for
fifteen years, relegating his ex-wife to the wilderness. The marriage had been
Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 303 (1990);
Carol Rogerson, Commentary, They Are Agreements Nonetheless, 20 CAN. J.
FAM. L. 197 (2003); Martha Shaffer, Domestic Contracts, Part I: The Supreme
Court of Canada Decision in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 20 CAN. J. FAM. L.
261 (2004). Cf. Robert Leckey, Contracting Claims and Family Feuds, 57 U.
TORONTO. L.J. 1 (2007).
122 Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, pt. IV (Can.).
123 Trociuk v. British Columbia (Att'y Gen.), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 (Can.); see
also Gavigan, supra note 32; Hester Lessard, Mothers, Fathers, and Naming:
Reflections on the Law Equality Framework and Trociuk v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), 16 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 165 (2001).
124 Trociuk, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 T 16.
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a second one for the husband, and his first marriage had ended by a get. At
the time of his second marriage, he had been thirty-seven years of age, and
his new wife was twenty. They separated after eleven years of marriage, and
by the time the husband finally appeared before the rabbinical court fifteen
years later, his ex-wife was forty-seven years of age. She had not remarried
nor had any other children. 12 The husband, relying on his freedom of religion
under the Quebec Charter of Rights,'26 denied the validity of the agreement
and further claimed that its religious aspect rendered it unenforceable in a civil
court.'27 The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed; speaking
for the majority, Madam Justice Rosalie Abella characterized the issues and
offered a methodology for analysis thereof:
Canada rightly prides itself on its evolutionary tolerance for diversity
and pluralism. This journey has included a growing appreciation for
multiculturalism, including the recognition that ethnic, religious or
cultural differences will be acknowledged and respected. Endorsed
in legal instruments ranging from the statutory protections found in
human rights codes to their constitutional enshrinement in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right to integrate into Canada's
mainstream based on and notwithstanding these differences has become
a defining part of our national character.
The right to have differences protected, however, does not mean
that those differences are always hegemonic. Not all differences are
compatible with Canada's fundamental values and, accordingly, not
all barriers are arbitrary. Determining when the assertion of a right
based on difference must yield to a more pressing public interest
is a complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies bright-line
application. It is, at the same time, a delicate necessity for protecting the
evolutionary integrity of both multi-culturalism and public confidence
in its importance.128
Justice Abella perhaps has framed the issue for future disputes where, in the
context of Canada's vibrant multicultural landscape, some Charter rights
and values, such as religious freedom, perhaps especially when cloaking
patriarchy, run up against other fundamental Charter values and rights, such
as equality.
125 Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.).
126 R.S.Q. c. C 12.
127 Bruker, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607.
128 Id. at 1-2.
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